








To reduce a negative externality, socially responsible households can invest respon-
sibly (SRI), consume responsibly (SRC), or do both. Which is better? In a closed
microeconomic model with intertwined product and capital markets, we analyze how
responsible households should use SRI and SRC to maximize their impact. Both
strategies reduce the externality as long as investors are risk-averse and the products
have no perfect substitutes. Responsible households gain the highest impact when
using SRC in equal proportion to SRI. A mere focus on SRC is never efficient. SRI
plays a role in any green strategy. The financial performance of green investments
is determined by the responsible households’ mix between SRI and SRC.
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1 Introduction
Today, the need for a more sustainable economy is on top of the agenda of policy makers,
investors and consumers. However, given the small size of an individual investor or con-
sumer compared to the size of the externality, responsible households may wonder if their
individual investment and consumption choices have an actual impact. Even if respon-
sible individuals can have a non-negligible impact, their effort may be at least partially
undone by other market participants. Especially divestment from dirty industries may
be compensated by other investors on the financial markets. In a model with intertwined
capital and product markets and endogenous market responses, this paper shows that
both socially responsible investment (SRI) and socially responsible consumption (SRC)
are effective. Both have a direct, symmetric and proportional impact in reducing a neg-
ative externality. To efficiently reach an impact, households should not try to shift asset
returns and product prices. They should reduce investment and consumption propor-
tionally. In particular, a reduction in consumption alone, without divestment in dirty
industries, is never efficient.
SRI has seen a remarkable growth in the past decade, notably among retail investors
(Bialkowski and Starks, 2017). Reallocating investments from dirty to clean companies is
supposed to affect the production, and thus, the supply side of firms.1 However, simply
discarding dirty stocks from the investment portfolios might not be effective, as there are
usually other less scrupulous investors willing to buy the shares.2 Moreover, divesting from
high yielding stocks might lead to a loss of household income. This raises the question
whether household investments are actually the right way for responsible households to
exert pressure. After all, SRI is not the only path that responsible households can take in
their quest for social impact. In fact, consumption volumes are one of the main drivers of
greenhouse gas emissions, as well as of other environmental problems (Alfredsson et al.,
1In this paper we will use the terms “clean” (“dirty”) to refer to a production that causes low (high)
negative externalities. The wording suggests an environmental externality, but the model applies to social
or other externalities as well.
2The engagement literature on SRI makes an another important point: Even if the divestment from
dirty companies actually raises the company’s capital cost this makes investments into pollution reducing
projects even less likely. In contrast, holding shares in dirty companies may be the only way to engage
with a business and fund a sustainable change (The Economist, 2021).
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2018). Would a focus on exerting pressure on the demand side in the form of sustainable
household consumption, therefore, have a larger impact?
Two thirds of EU citizens realize that changing their consumption habits can have a
significant sustainable impact (European Parliament, 2020). However, a number of stud-
ies identified a gap between consumers’ good intentions and their actual behavior (e. g.,
Nguyen et al., 2019; White et al., 2019). Of course, consumption decisions are not ex-
clusively driven by sustainability considerations. Other factors such as relative prices,
preferences for the consumption good, income, as well as social norms and peer pressures
affect the consumption decisions as well. Moreover, the consumer’s perception of their in-
dividual impact is a moderator for more sustainable consumption (Chen and Hung, 2016).
The higher the perceived impact, the more willing are households to behave responsibly.
It is therefore important to understand how responsible households can maximize their
impact on reducing an externality. Should they better refrain from dirty investment (SRI)
or cut their dirty consumption instead (SRC)?
Our paper provides the first theoretical analysis of this fundamental question. Responsible
households can choose to contribute to an externality reduction by affecting the supply
side via their investment decisions and the demand side via their consumption choices.
The responsible choice has indirect effects through market prices and the corresponding
impact on the other households’ consumption and investment decisions. Moreover, we
explicitly acknowledge that both markets are intertwined: the cost of capital influences
product prices as much as product market profits affect investment yields. When choosing
how to exert their impact, responsible households anticipate the responses of the other
market participants. The optimal impact level chosen by households depends on economic
uncertainty, risk aversion, relative product preferences as well as social norms and peer
pressures.
In our model, firms produce a good that entails a negative externality.3 Households
first invest into firms, then spend the investment return on consumption. A fraction of
households is “responsible” and takes the externality of their decision into account, at least
3For a positive externality, the problem is similar to public good provision by private households, as
in Bergstrom et al. (1986).
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partially.4 If they do so when investing, this is called SRI; if they do so when consuming,
this is called SRC. Firms use the invested money to produce goods, then sell the goods
on a competitive market, earn the revenue, and suffer from a profit shock. Households
collect profits from the firms.
Our study makes three contributions to the literature on green finance. First, we show that
both – SRI and SRC – are effective in reducing the externality. Their relative effectiveness
depends on the risk aversion and goods preferences of the standard households, which alter
the market response to price changes. This result implies that each household has the
same impact no matter if the proportion of responsible households is high or low.
Second, we show that responsible households optimally exert their impact by cutting
consumption in proportion to their divestment from the dirty firm. Intuitively, given a
minimum acceptable utility, responsible households maximize their impact by divesting
exactly the amount of capital that became redundant because of the intended reduction
in dirty consumption, and thus leave equilibrium prices unchanged. It is optimal to re-
duce investment and consumption in proportion because any disproportionate effort in
one market will be at least partially offset by the other market participants. For example,
if risk aversion is low, it is cheap to reduce investment in the dirty industry, but other
investors have also a low risk aversion and thus readjust their investment accordingly.
Hence, the cost is low, but the effect is also low. The same argument holds for the other
exogenous parameters. Introducing differences in risk aversion and product preferences
between responsible and standard households allow us to analyze how preference hetero-
geneity affects the optimal mix of responsible behaviors. We show that the proportionality
result holds even with heterogeneous preferences on risk and product substitutability.
Third, we show that the relative financial performance of responsible investments depends
on how well households are able to coordinate on responsible behavior in both markets.
We first describe the optimal coordinated action. If coordination (commitment) is not
feasible, we show that social action can be implemented with the help of peer pressure
(”shame & blame”). If households can only commit to SRC but not SRI, green invest-
4In the model, agents are called households. They can also be interpreted as states, deciding on how
much to tax carbon emissions, and whether to invest into dirty firms, or in countries with a large carbon
footprint.
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ments financially underperform dirty shares, vice versa. Finally, we analyze the effect of
imperfect competition and show that if firms have some market power, SRI and SRC can
induce change towards a more sustainable technology.
Literature. One of the first attempts to introduce social aspects into finance theory is
marked by Gali (1994) who extent the CAPM model by allowing investors to care about
their relative standard of living. This consumption externality rather reflects a form of
envy than the idea of a socially responsible investor. In contrast, Benabou and Tirole
(2010) develop a theory of prosocial behavior to explain why people commonly engage
in activities that are costly to themselves and mostly benefit others. Socially responsible
households in our model behave also in this vein: they are willing to sacrifice utility to
reduce a negative externality. Moisson (2021) proposes a model in which the morality of
investors can take several forms, such as rule consequentialism, direct consequentialism,
and shared responsibility. The modeling of social responsible households in our paper is
closest to the moral concept of direct consequentialism as households are concerned with
the direct impact of their investment and consumption decisions.
The willingness of SRI investors to forgo financial performance to invest in accordance with
their social preferences is well documented. For example, SRI money flows appear to be
less sensitive to past performance than flows to otherwise comparable funds (Renneboog
et al., 2011). Moreover, SRI funds have shown greater and more persistence growth despite
similar financial performances (Bialkowski and Starks, 2017). In general, social preferences
and social signalling are better predictors of SRI than financial motives (Riedl and Smeets,
2017) and certified green assets are issued at a premium (Baker et al., 2018). Even venture
capital investors are willing to sacrifice returns in exchange for environmental impact
(Barber et al., 2021). Other studies indicate that socially responsible investments are
also rationally motivated. Several studies provide empirical evidence that SRI financially
outperform their peers (Revelli and Viviani, 2015; Busch and Friede, 2018). As SRI
becomes more popular, the difficulty is to find evidence for the direction of causality
between of performance and certified social responsibility of assets. It is not clear if SRI
indeed show better financial performance or if the reversed causality is true, that successful
firms who want to attract investors focus more on social responsibility. A more established
fact is that SRI allows to diversify the expected risks associated with climate change. To
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minimize climate risks, investors diversify between SRI and engagement in dirty stocks,
which is perceived as a better risk management strategy than simple divestment from
dirty stocks (Krueger et al., 2020). SRI thereby does not require an entire divestment from
dirty stocks. Flammer (2021) shows that companies can credibly signal their commitment
towards environmentally friendly investments by issuing corporate green bonds. SRI can
therefore also foster a change towards more sustainability of dirty firms.
This distinction between engagement for impact and the effect of divestment also marks
the two main strands of the theoretical literature on SRI. The engagement literature
analyzes how SRI can actively influence a firm’s decision to become more sustainable.
Chowdhry et al. (2018) analyze conditions under which the joint financing of purely profit-
oriented and socially responsible investors improve social outcomes. Similarly, Oehmke
and Opp (2020) analyze the impact of social responsible investment on financially con-
strained firms’ production choices. The model closest to our modeling of SRI is Heinkel
et al. (2001). They show that exclusionary investment strategies alter the risk sharing
opportunities such that dirty firms face an increasing cost of capital if investors invest
socially responsible. This risk-sharing friction also alters the equilibrium funding costs in
our setup. Heinkel et al. (2001) show that if the funding cost differences between clean
and dirty firms become large enough, dirty firms switch to invest into a more sustainable
production. Hence, if investors are risk averse, SRI can affect corporate behavior.5
We also discuss the impact of SRI on ex-ante production choices in an extension, but
the main effect of SRI in our model is a reduction in the production quantity of dirty
firms due to the increase in funding costs. Pedersen et al. (2021) develop a model in
which they combine the income hurting effect of SRI with the income increasing effect
of better long-term performance. Goldstein et al. (2021) show how the presence of green
stocks and green investors influences price informativeness, and thus risk. Zerbib (2020)
show that the focus of investors on SRI stocks and the according divestment from sin
stocks actually improves the relative financial performance of sin stocks. This trade-off
also plays a role in our model. As responsible investors refrain from investing in dirty
stocks, the marginal yield increases and attracts more standard investors, which partially
5In a world without frictions, with risk neutral investors, SRI would not have an impact on corpo-
rate behavior because even though responsible investors eschew dirty stocks their investments would be
perfectly substituted by less ethical investors. We discuss the importance of risk aversion in Section 5
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offsets the responsible investment. Pastor et al. (2021) develop a model of sustainable
capital markets. Sustainable firms face lower funding costs because investors accept lower
returns. In equilibrium, asset prices adjust to investor preferences, which pushes the
market portfolio toward the portfolio desired by socially responsible investors. The capital
market mechanism in our model is similar but in addition, our model allows for spillover
effects on the product market.
These synergies between SRI and SRC have been largely neglected in the literature. A
remarkable exception is Albuquerque et al. (2019), who analyze how SRI can increase firm
profitability due to an increase in the loyalty of their customer base. The loyalty shift
increases the price elasticity of demand which allows socially responsible firms to be more
profitable and to be more resistant in an economic downturn. Albuquerque et al. (2020)
confirm these theoretical predictions, using the Covid-19 Pandemic as an exogenous shock
on product demand. They find that more sustainable companies suffer less during the
economic recession. In our model, responsible households are more sensitive to the price
changes of the dirty good as well. Our extension shows that if companies reduce their
production externalities, responsible households consume more of their products.
The impact of responsible household consumption on firm production choices is receiving
increased attention from policy makers and academia (Peloza et al., 2013) as well. How-
ever, the focus of academic research is mainly based on consumer behavior (Nguyen et al.,
2019; White et al., 2019) and how more sustainable production can increase demand for
goods. In contrast, our paper contributes to the literature by analyzing the interplay
between responsible investment, production, and consumption.
There is a second strand of related literature, dealing with the optimal taxation of financial
markets and institutions. These models typically assume that a policy maker needs to
collect taxes, mixing between different resources of tax income. It would then try to find
a mix that minimizes the distortions and utility losses of households (see the seminal
work of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a,b), and also Grubert and Mackie (1999), Auerbach
and Gordon (2002), Boadway and Keen (2003), Buettner and Erbe (2014), for example).
In our approach, responsible households want to maximize the distortion they generate
given an acceptable loss of utility.6 Conceptually, our responsible households can also be
6If responsible households had political clout, they could convince the policy maker to introduce a
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interpreted as responsible countries that try to commit to an international agreement on
the restriction of a negative externality such as a commitment to reduce carbon dioxide
emissions, e.g., by introducing a Pigouvian tax.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model,
including socially responsible households and presents our main results. Section 3 inves-
tigates the impact outcome if responsible households can coordinate on a social action.
The section also discusses how households can commit to reducing dirty investment and
consumption, for example, by implementing a system of peer pressure (”shame & blame”).
Section 4 analyzes the role of competition between firms and asks which investment and
consumption strategy best induces firms to implement a cleaner technology. Section 5
analyzes how household heterogeneity (e. g., in preferences) influences the outcome. Sec-
tion 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Setting. Consider an economy with a continuum of households of mass 1, each endowed
with an initial wealth of w0. Households first take an investment decision, earn a stochastic
return, and then decide how much of the produced good to consume. The good is produced
by a continuum of firms whose production function is Q = I/c, where Q is the production
quantity, I is the aggregate investment and c is the production cost parameter. The firms’
profit is
Π = (P + ε)Q = (P + ε) I/c, (1)
where P is the price that clears the product market, and ε ∼ N(0, σ) is a normally
distributed exogenous shock with zero mean and standard deviation σ. This shock intro-
duces risk into the firms’ profits. It can be interpreted as the uncertainty that stems from
selling the firm’s real assets.
Pigovian tax on the good with the negative externality. In this paper, we implicitly assume that this
political way is not an option. One reason might be that responsible households do not have a majority,
or that the externality occurs globally whereas the political system is implemented at regional levels.
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The firms’ profits are shared between investors, i. e., households that have invested in the
firm. Given an aggregate investment I, a household that has invested i owns a fraction
i/I of the shares. It has a claim on the fraction i ·Π/I of firm profits. Households decide
individually. Because household types have homogeneous preferences only symmetric
equilibria exist. We can, thus, omit an index for each single household. The gross risk-
free rate is rf . In addition to consuming the good, households derive utility from money
that they can use to consume other goods outside the focus of this model.
The production and consumption of the good generate an externality. Let xC denote the
per-unit externality from consumption. Examples are the hazards of passive smoking, or
the carbon emissions from driving a car, and so forth. Let xP denote the per-unit exter-
nality from production. Examples are the ecological impact of intensive agriculture, the
pollution and emissions of production plants, and so forth. Because of the linear produc-
tion technology, input and output are proportional, hence it does not matter whether the
externality occurs in the production process or at consumption. We can simply denote
x = xC/c+ xP as the aggregate externality, with
x I = xCQ+ xP I = xC I/c+ xP I. (2)
The aggregate x can be positive or negative in general, but we will concentrate on the




m+ a q − b q2/2− x I
)
with u(c) = −e−ρ c (3)
where m is the amount of money left for the consumption of other goods that do not cause
externalities. The quantity of the dirty good consumed is q, the preference for the product
is a, and b measures its substitutability. The coefficient ρ gives the absolute risk aversion.
As in (2), I is the aggregate investment volume of the firm, and x is the externality.
There are two types of households. A fraction 1− γ are standard households who do not
care about the externality in their individual decisions. They invest iS and consume qS
to maximize their expected utility. A fraction γ is called responsible. Responsible house-
holds want to reduce the negative externality. In exchange for such an impact, responsible
households are willing potentially to sacrifice some of their utility. We first analyze which
consumption and investment strategy optimizes the trade-off between impact and utility.
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Later in Section 3, responsible households are able to coordinate with other responsi-
ble households on an optimal social action. The extent of that action depends on the
responsible group size and the size of the externality.
To reduce the externality, responsible households can affect the supply side via their
investment decision iR = iS−∆i, where ∆i denotes the divestment from dirty production,
and the demand side via their consumption choice qR = qS − ∆q, where ∆q denotes
the responsible reduction in dirty consumption. However, they face two challenges: (i)
their individual actions have very little impact, and (ii) their impact may be partially
undone by the other market participants. Given the optimal behavior and responses of
standard households, we first analyze the effectiveness of each responsible action ∆i > 0
and ∆q > 0 in reducing the externality. We then derive the efficient combination of
responsible investment ∆i and consumption ∆q for any target impact level. Finally, we
analyze the optimal target impact level, to which responsible households commit if they
can coordinate their actions in both markets. The timeline of the model is given in
Figure 1.
t = 0
• Households born with wealth w0.
• Firms have no capital.
• Capital market: Each household in-
vests i of w0 into firms.
• Production: Firms invest aggregate
I =
∑
i and produce Q = I/c of the
dirty good.
t = 1
• Product market: Firms sell dirty
good to households at price P .
• A profit shock εQ hits the firm.
• Profits are distributed to investors.
• Households consume dirty good and
use remaining wealth for other con-
sumption.
Figure 1: Sequence of Events
Product Market Equilibrium. To solve the model by backward induction, we start
with the product market. Resulting from the earlier investment decision, a standard
household has wealth wS at date t = 1. The wealth may depend on the outcome of earlier
investment decisions, and potentially differ from that of responsible households. Given
10
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wS, each standard household decides on how much to buy of the good in t = 1. The
budget constraint is mS = wS − P qS. Its objective function is therefore
US = −e−ρ (wS−P qS+a qS−b q
2
S/2) eρ x I (4)
The first order condition is
∂US
∂qS
= ρ (a− b qS − P ) e−ρ (wS−P qS+a qS−b q
2






The optimal consumption depends on the price of the good and the preferences for it,
but is independent of the wealth wS. If responsible households behaved like standard
households, aggregate consumption would be Q = (a−P )/b. To behave responsible they
may reduce their consumption by ∆q and consume only qR = q
∗





− γ∆q, or equivalently
P = a− b (Q+ γ∆q). (7)
Due to the nested structure of the utility function, neither the households’ risk aversion nor
return expectations play a role for their consumption choices. The inner utility function
yields a linear demand function for the good. Responsible consumption (∆q) reduces the
market price of the dirty good, which makes it more attractive for standard households.
Capital Market Equilibrium. Now we proceed to date t = 0 in the backward induc-
tion. Anticipating the optimal consumption choices at t = 1, standard households decide
how much to invest into the firm and into other assets. Each household is marginal,
hence they take the aggregate investment I as given. With Q = I/c, the return r from
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The return r decreases in the aggregate investment. A higher investment leads to a
higher output, which depresses the prices and thus the firms’ profits. Due to the profit
shock ε, the return r is normally distributed with mean P/c and standard deviation σ/c.
Substituting q∗S into (4), we obtain the standard household’s expected utility
US = −e
(a−P )2
2 b eρ x I
∫
−e−ρw1 f(w1) dw1. (9)
If standard households invest iS of the initial wealth, they receive a random r iS from that
investment, in addition to the safe return (w0 − iS) rf . The household’s wealth at date
t = 1 will be w1 = (w0 − iS) rf + r iS. It chooses iS to maximize expected utility
EUS = −e
(a−P )2























(a− c rf )− γ (∆q b+ ∆i ρ σ2/c)
)
. (13)
This proves our first result.
Proposition 1 (Effectiveness) Both divestment ∆i and consumption reduction ∆q are
effective measures to reduce the aggregate externality in equilibrium. The marginal rate of








The marginal rate of transformation reflects the amount of dirty consumption that re-
sponsible households can additionally consume if they give up a unit of dirty investment
and hold their impact level constant. It measures the relative effectiveness between SRI
12
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Here, and in all following figures: c = 1, σ = 1, ρ = 1/3, a = 2, b = 1/2, x = 1, γ = 1/3 and rf = 1.
and SRC. Both a reduction in investment iR and in consumption qR have a comparable
impact. The effectiveness of a reduction in investment iR increases in the asset risk risk
σ, and risk aversion ρ. The effectiveness of a reduction in consumption qR increases in
the product specificity b.
Figure 2 illustrates the proposition, showing that iR and qR have a symmetric impact. In
the absence of responsible households, Q∗ = (a− c rf )/(b+ ρ σ2). This is the individually
rational choice of standard households, denoted by the brown point at i = 1.2 and q = 1.2.
The parallel lines are iso-impact lines; their slope is the MRT. If responsible households
reduce investment or consumption, also the aggregate externality x I goes down.
We now analyze which mix of consumption reduction ∆q and investment reduction ∆i
optimizes the responsible household’s trade-off between expected utility and impact.This
optimization requires that for any target impact, the household chooses the combination
of qR and iR that maximizes expected utility. The marginal rate of substitution (MRS),
defined by the household’s utility function, must equal the marginal rate of transforma-
tion (MRT), defined by the standard households’ reaction. According to the following
proposition, this holds if ∆q and ∆i are proportional.
13
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It is always optimal to reduce investment and consumption by the same factor, such that
the equilibrium price and asset return remain unchanged.
The proof is algebraically involved but straightforward. Take the target I∗ as constant,
then Q∗ = I∗/c is also constant. Solve (13) for qR, and substitute into UR. The first order
condition with respect to iR yields the optimal iR, and then also qR. Looking at the ratio
between the two and at the second order condition completes the proof. 


































Figure 3 shows how the expected utility of individual responsible households depends on
qR and iR (warm colors stand for high utility). The individual utility is maximized at
∆i = ∆q = 0. If responsible households want to have an impact, they must deviate from
this point towards the origin. For each impact level, the utility is maximized on the green
line, given by q∗R = i
∗
R/c, and thus also ∆q
∗ = ∆i∗/c.
There is an additional interesting property of the equilibrium. For given ∆i and ∆q, the
14
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equilibrium price is
P =












b c rf + a ρ σ
2
b+ ρ σ2






If responsible households efficiently reduce their dirty investment and consumption such
that ∆q∗ = ∆i∗/c, both the market price P for the good and the expected return from
investment are the same as in the absence of responsible households. Consequently, the
standard households’ consumption level q∗S and investment level i
∗
S remain unchanged.
In principle, responsible households could reduce consumption relatively more than they
reduce investment. This would imply that the price for the good would decrease, and
standard households would buy more of it. On the other hand, the financing cost for the
firm would increase, and standard households would invest less. Responsible households
could also do the opposite, reduce investment relatively more than consumption. Then the
standard households’ reaction would go in the opposite direction. Proposition 2 states
that neither of this disproportionate reductions are efficient. The same impact can be
achieved with a smaller reduction in utility. The rationale is that any disproportionate
change is offset at least partially by the market response of standard households. If the
utility loss from a reduction in the investment ∆i is low, e. g., because risk aversion or
the risk itself are low, it is also very easy for standard households to substitute for the
reduced investment. The same is true for a reduction in qR. Therefore, the highest impact
results from a proportional reduction in both investment and consumption.
3 Coordinated Action
Up to now, we have considered the optimal combination of responsible reductions in con-
sumption and investment to achieve a given target impact level. But how do responsible
households decide on their target impact level? The individual impact of each individual
responsible household is infinitesimally small. By reducing consumption and investment,
each household can only achieve a marginal impact on the externality, but suffers a dis-
crete utility loss. It is thus rational from the individual perspective to neglect the negative
15
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externality. However, from a collective perspective, households can benefit from responsi-
ble behavior. They profit not only from their own infinitesimal impact, but also from that
of other responsible households. We therefore assume now that responsible households
can coordinate on implementing the collectively optimal action.
Proposition 3 (Optimum under Coordination) If γ x ≤ a/c−rf , responsible house-








In the absence of short-selling, if γ x > a/c− rf , households consume nothing and invest
nothing.
Given these choices, because i∗R = c q
∗
R as in Proposition 2, the equilibrium price P and
standard households’ choices iS and qS are all independent of x and γ.





























We illustrate the optimal choice of a collective action in Figure 4. In the figure, γ = 1/3
of households are responsible, and the externality is x = 1. If responsible households
collectively reduce qR and iR, they profit from the reduced externality. The optimal
16
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point is at q∗R = 0.8 and i
∗
R = 0.8. As before, it is optimal for responsible households
to reduce investment and consumption proportionally. An increase in the externality x
or the fraction of responsible households increases moves the collectively optimal point
towards the origin. For γ x = a/c − rf , the origin is reached. For γ x > a/c − rf , it is
collectively optimal to consume nothing, q∗R = 0, and (if that is possible) to short-sell
shares,
i∗S = −
c (1− γ) (c (rf + x γ)− a)
b (c2 (1− γ) + 2 γ) + c2 (1− γ) ρ σ2
< 0.
With short selling, investment and consumption are no longer reduced in proportion.
Therefore, the responsible behavior now also affects the equilibrium price P . Standard
households react by investing more and consuming less. This is visible in Figure 5. The
standard choice in the absence of short-selling would be i∗S = 1.2 and q
∗
S = 1.2. In the
presence of short-selling, i∗R = −0.17, and standard households react with i∗S = 1.25 and
q∗S = 1.17. Because standard households have reduced their consumption, and responsible
households are already at zero, the externality is further reduced. Without short-selling,
Q∗ = 0.8, with short-selling, it is Q∗ = 0.78. The numerical example also underlines that,
if consumption and investment are not reduced proportionally, the impact is relatively
small. In the figure, the two brown points (with and without shortselling) are seemingly
on the same iso-impact line. The difference in impact is tiny.
So far we simply assumed responsible households could commit to a level of investment
and consumption. However, without any credible commitment, responsible households
would have an individual incentive to deviate from the collectively chosen consumption
and free-ride on the responsible behavior of others. Households thus require a commitment
device. We consider two devices: taxation and a mechanism based on “shame & blame”.
Taxation. The γ responsible households can be interpreted as members of a country or
some other political entity. They could then vote to implement a tax τI on investment,
and a tax τC on consumption. If there are no administrative costs, investment and
consumption are perfectly observable, and if taxes are redistributed to the households in
the entity, the collectively optimal decision of Proposition 3 can be implemented.
Shame & Blame. In the absence of political institutions, responsible households can
also be interpreted as members of a social group of size γ. Because of their potential
17
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connection, members can observe the actions of the others (e. g. through social media).
To reduce the externality, the members of the group can shame & blame each other for
the investment in the dirty industry, or the consumption of the dirty good. Assume
that exerting shame & blame is free, but it leads to a reduction in utility of the blamed
household by gI for each dollar invested, and gC for each unit consumed.
7 It is equivalent
to a tax that is not restituted to the group. Shame & blame, thus, directly affects the
expected utility of each household, similar to a warm glow (see Andreoni, 1990) with a
negative sign. The utility function of a responsible household becomes
UR = u
(
m+ a qR − b q2R/2− x I − gI iR − gC c qR
)
. (18)
The direct disutility from shame & blame is zero in the two limiting cases: If gI = 0
and gC = 0 such that households do not shame & blame each other, and if iR = 0 and
qR = 0 such that responsible households abstain from any dirty investment and consump-
tion. If responsible households gradually reduce their investment and consumption as in
Proposition 3, shame & blame reduces the responsible households’ utility. This additional
7The disutility can also be interpreted as a feeling of guilt. However, shame & blame can be chosen
endogenously, whereas guilt, as part of the utility function, might be seen as exogenous.
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reduction in utility creates a centrifugal force. These forces make any mix of SRI and
SRC inefficient if households can only commit to responsible behavior by shaming and
blaming each other.
To see this, consider first the demand for the product of responsible households
q∗R =
a− P − c gC
b
, (19)
toned down due to disutility gC. Similarly, the investment for a given share price is
i∗R =
P/c− rf − gI
ρ σ2
. (20)
In combination with the market clearing conditions on the product market and the stock
market, and the demand of standard households, we obtain an aggregate quantity
Q∗ =
a− c (rf + γ(gI + gC))
b+ c2 ρ σ2
. (21)
The disutility from investment gI and from consumption gC have an identical effect on
aggregate production Q∗. If ρ is low, an increase in gI has a strong effect on investment by
responsible households i∗R, but the standard households are also more willing to substitute
by investing more. The role of risk aversion cancels out. The same holds for a larger b.
Figure 6 shows the iso-impact lines as black diagonals. Each line has a slope of −1. The
impact is lowest at the origin and increases towards the north-east.
The figure also shows the expected utility of responsible households, depending on the
disutility from investment gI and that from consumption gC . In the numerical example,
for gI = 0.4, investment iR by responsible households becomes zero. For gC = 0.6,
consumption qR by responsible households becomes zero. Increasing gI or gC above these
levels has no additional impact.
The disutility created from shame & blame has an important implication for the optimal
individual choice. For a given target impact on the externality, the utility-maximizing
choice is always a corner solution. In contrast to Proposition 2, responsible households
now focus on either divestment or consumption reduction. For small impact levels, it
consists of either reducing investment (by an increase in gI), or reducing consumption (by
an increase in gC), but not both. For large impact levels, it consists of either qR = 0 or
19
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Figure 6: Expected Utility of Responsible Households













iR = 0, and a reduction of the other amount. The rationale is the mentioned centrifugal
force due to the direct disutility induced by guilt.
Also the insights from Proposition 3 change. The collectively optimal choice does not
depend continuously on the fraction γ and the externality x. The optimal shame & blame
policy is rather binary. For low levels of γ and x, it is optimal to do nothing and set
gI = gC = 0. At the point
2 γ x = a/c− rf ,
it becomes optimal to set gI and gC to a level that prevents responsible households from
both dirty investment and dirty consumption. In a sense, the responsible households’
choice is always extreme. Either they behave just like standard households (for low γ x),
or they neither invest nor consume (for high γ x). In that second case, they use shame &
blame on each other, but because they neither invest nor consume, this does not create
any direct disutility. The group size becomes crucial for social action. If the group size
is too small, given the externality, responsible households fail to coordinate on reducing
the externality. If the group size is large enough, responsible households credibly commit
to reduce the externality without any direct disutility from shaming and blaming. The
coordination implies a commitment on a shame & blame threat that deters any dirty
investment or consumption of the group members.
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Empirical Implications of Imperfect Coordination. Commitment to coordinated
social action can be achieved in several ways. Coordination might be more feasible in one
market than in the other. On the one hand, one could argue that investing in a green fund
offers a natural way of coordinating SRI. Yet, the individual investment decision is hard
to observe. Consumption behavior on the other hand, might be easily observed such that
coordination based on peer pressure might be more feasible for SRC. Our model implies
testable empirical implications for the case where households can better coordinate in one
market than in the other. We use (16) to derive the implications of responsible household
behavior on the financial performance of SRI.
If responsible households can coordinate on SRC, but fail to coordinate on SRI, green in-
vestments yield a lower financial performance than dirty shares. If responsible households
focus on SRI, neglecting SRC, green investments outperform dirty shares. This result may
explain why empirical papers obtain contradicting results on the relative performance of
green investments over time and in different countries.
4 Market Power and Green Transition
In our baseline model we assume that the producers sell their goods under perfect compe-
tition. The residual profit of firms is zero, because all profits are allocated to households.
We now consider a monopolistic firm.8 For exposition, assume that the monopolist is
penny-less and very risk averse. In the absence of a moral hazard problem, the monopo-
list chooses to hold no shares by herself, but to earn a fixed margin m. The time structure
is: the monopolist first sets her margin m. Responsible households consider how much to
consume and to invest. The monopolist sells the shares of the firm on the capital market,
produces, and sells the goods on the product market.
There is one major change in this setting. The firm still has earnings of γ = (P + ε)Q,
but now the margin m is deducted, so the profit is γ = (P −m+ ε)Q. For shareholders,
8In our model, the degree of competition is assumed to be exogenous. Aghion et al. (2019) propose a
model in which firms can implement a clean technology to reduce competition. To some degree, this is
also captured in this section, when firms choose a cleaner technology to attract more customers.
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the return per unit of investment is thus γ/I = (P −m + ε)/c. In analogy to (11), the
investment supply of standard households is then
i∗S = c
2 (P −m)/c− rf
ρ σ2
.





(1− γ) (a−m− c rf ) + γ (qR b+ iRρ σ2/c)
)
. (22)
The responsible households’ effect on the equilibrium quantity is unchanged. Proposition 1
does not even have to be adapted. Also Proposition 2 is unchanged. For any given impact
level, the ratio i∗R/q
∗
R = c is constant. This means that responsible households should
reduce investment and consumption in proportion. The choices of standard households
are unaffected. If responsible households can coordinate, their optimal choice is
i∗R = c




a−m− c (rf + γ x)
b+ ρ σ2
. (23)
Hence, the message from Proposition 3, that responsible households should reduce in-
vestment and consumption in proportion, holds true in the absence of competition. The
according equilibrium quantity is
Q =
a−m− c (rf + γ2 x)
b+ ρ σ2
.
The monopolist will maximize mQ and thus set
m∗ =
a− c (rf + γ2 x)
2
, (24)
resulting in an equilibrium quantity of
Q∗ =
a− c (rf + γ2 x)
2 (b+ ρ σ2)
.
Hence, the quantity is reduced by half, no matter whether responsible households are
present or not. Inserting (24) into (23) shows that the equilibrium investment and con-
sumption of responsible households decrease by half. In proportion to the choices of
standard households, the optimal divestment and cutting consumption are unchanged in
the monopoly.
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The Green Transition. In the basic model, the externality is assumed to be fixed.
More realistically, firms can choose between different production technologies. The en-
gagement literature on SRI argues that responsible investors can affect the firms’ choice
of production technology. Rather than simply divesting from dirty firms, they can try and
make dirty firms cleaner (Chowdhry et al., 2018; Landier and Lovo, 2020; Oehmke and
Opp, 2020; Krahnen et al., 2021). In the model, one technology (dirty) may be cheaper,
whereas the other (clean) may lead to fewer emissions. Responsible investors exert pres-
sure on dirty firms by not buying their shares or products, thus reducing their profits.
In analogy to the basic model, we analyze whether responsible households have a higher
effect on the choice of a production technology when investing responsibly, or consuming
responsibly.9
Consider the following time structure. The monopolist first chooses her profit margin,
and a production technology. A reduction of the externality is accompanied by an cost
increase. After the production technology has been selected, responsible households decide
how much to invest and to consume, anticipating the standard households’ reaction. We
assume that responsible households are able to coordinate on the optimal divestment and
consumption reduction characterized in Proposition 3.
The optimal margin m∗ is given by (24), leading to an expected profit for the monopolist
m∗Q∗ =
(
a− c (rf + γ2 x)
)2
4 (b+ ρ σ2)
.
This profit is decreasing in both c and x. Now assume that the cost c is a decreasing
function of the externality, c′(x) < 0, and it is zero at the maximal emission, c(xmax) = 0.









rf + γ2 x
.
This implies that, if there are no responsible households at all (γ = 0), the monopolist
will not bother to reduce the externality and choose x = xmax. The higher the fraction
9In a more complex model, responsible investors could buy shares of dirty firms and then use their
voting rights to push the firm towards implementing a cleaner technology. To do so, they need to hold
a considerable fraction of shares, or one needs to assume probabilistic voting. Otherwise, a minority of
responsible investors has no clout.
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γ, the more the monopolist will invest in its reduction. Only the amount of responsible
households matters because they optimally reduce their consumption proportional to
their divestment. The lower the externality, the more willing are responsible households
to consume and invest. This creates an ex ante incentive for the monopolist to choose
a lower production externality. Given that responsible households exist, the monopolist
chooses a lower production externality, the lower the risk-free rate rf and (cum grano
salis) the higher the initial externality x.
5 Heterogeneity
In the basic model, standard and responsible households have identical preferences. In
reality, this need not be the case. For example, one could interpret standard investors as
large institutional investors, which might have better diversification opportunities, and
therefore a smaller effective degree of risk aversion. Moreover, the dirty good might
be a regional product. Standard households could then be interpreted as international
consumers in the market, caring less about consuming the good. Such a heterogeneity may
affect our results. For example, if responsible households are more risk averse, they will
start from a lower level of investment, even if their intended impact level was zero. On the
other hand, once the more risk averse responsible households reduce their investment, less
risk averse standard households will react stronger and increase their investment more,
because they care less about the increased risk exposure. In this section, we analyze the
aggregate effects of possible heterogeneity in preferences.
Heterogeneous Risk Aversion. We first analyze the effect of different degrees of
risk aversion. Responsible households may have fewer possibilities to diversify, and may
therefore be more risk averse than standard households such that it is reasonable to
assume ρR 6= ρS. We concentrate on the case ρR > ρS.
Equation (13) depends only on the standard households’ preferences, but not on those of
responsible households. Consequently, Proposition 1 refers exclusively to the risk and con-
sumption preferences of standard households. For ρR > ρS the marginal rate of technical
24
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The effect of a reduction in investment iR decreases if standard households’ risk aversion
ρS is small.
Proposition 2 also changes. While it is still optimal to reduce investment and consumption









The intuition is the following. If the risk aversion of responsible households is higher than
that of the standard households, reducing investment is relatively costly for responsible
households and will be nearly completely offset by standard households. However, in
equilibrium, responsible households will not invest much anyway due to their high risk
aversion. Hence, it is efficient to reduce investment only a little, but also from a low
starting level. This, in the end, leads to the proportionality result. Both investment and
consumption are reduced in proportion.
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Figure 7 illustrates the effects. The brown point shows the combination of investment
and consumption for standard households. In the example, ρR = 2 ρS, thus the optimal
investment by responsible households is half as large. The optimal consumption is iden-
tical. For each impact level, given by the black diagonal lines, the utility of responsible
households is maximized on the green line. In comparison to Figure 3, the green line is
steeper, but it still goes through the origin. Responsible households should still reduce
investment and consumption proportionally.
Heterogeneous Product Preferences. Similar to the better diversified international
investors, international standard households might have a lower preference for the local
product, aS < aR. In (13), the parameter a only depends on the standard households such
that we can replace it with aS. The heterogeneity of product preferences does not affect
Proposition 1. However, Proposition 2 needs to be adapted. The optimal combination of










Due to the preference heterogeneity, it is no longer optimal for responsible households to
reduce iR and qR in the same proportion. In the case that aS < aR, the investment should
be reduced more than proportionally.
We illustrate this point in Figure 8, which shows the expected utility of responsible
households with a stronger preference for the good, aR = 2.1 > aS = 2.0. The utility-
maximizing investment is still at i∗R = 1.2, but the consumption increases to q
∗
R = 1.4.
Standard households optimally invest the same amount, but consume less. For each tar-
geted impact level, responsible households maximized their consumption on the green line.




. Here, aR − aS = 0.1,
b = 0.5, and γ → 0, such that the shift is 0.2. In the numerical example, investment
should be reduced more than proportionally, consumption should be reduced less than
proportionally. For large target impact levels, short selling the shares may be optimal.
Heterogeneous Product Substitutability. The substitutability parameter b may
also differ between the two groups of investors. For example, responsible investors might
find it easier to switch between producers such that bR > bS, or vice versa.
26
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3846367











Proposition 1 refers exclusively to the substitutability of standard households such that






The impact of consumption reduction ∆q vanishes if standard households’ find it very
easy to switch to another product. Proposition 2 also changes. It is still optimal for
responsible households to reduce investment and consumption in proportion. However,









In Figure 9, we still have bS = 0.5, but bR = 0.6. This means that for responsible
households, the utility from the good decreases faster as they consume more of it. Con-
sequently, i∗R = 1.2 still, but now q
∗
R = 1.0 instead of 1.2. The green line, again showing
the optimal combination of iR and qR for a given impact level, is flatter. However, it still
goes through the origin; a proportional reduction in iR and qR is efficient.
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Ethical concerns gain importance for retail investors. However, investment, production,
and consumption decisions are intertwined and should not be studied separately. We raise
the question whether small household investors should worry about ethics when investing
money. Alternatively, households could focus on more sustainable consumption and worry
less when investing. We develop a tractable, closed microeconomic model of interlinked
capital and goods markets that allows us to analyze the optimal choice of responsible
households. We show that responsible concerns matter, regardless of whether they oc-
cur when investing (socially responsible investment, SRI) or when consuming (socially
responsible consumption, SRC) as long as standard households (“the others”) are risk
averse and find it difficult to replace the dirty good. However, to achieve the greatest
impact at the lowest possible utility loss, responsible households need to reduce their
dirty consumption proportionally to their divestment from dirty firms (Proposition 2).
A disproportional reduction would be substituted by other market participants, at least
partially, and is therefore never optimal.
If responsible households are able to coordinate, their commitment to proportional con-
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sumption and investment reduction increases with the externality and their group size.
The proportionality implies that responsible households do not influence product prices
and capital returns. If responsible households, however, can only coordinate in one mar-
ket, market prices and returns change. A focus on SRC without coordination on SRC
implies that clean firms yield a lower financial performance than dirty firms and vice versa.
A commitment device to such a collective action could be a consumption and investment
tax. If responsible households cannot implement such a tax, they can exert peer pressure
in the form of “shame & blame” to yield an impact. Peer pressure introduces a pecking
order between responsible consumption and investment, such that responsible households
first focus on the market where substitution is harder. If responsible households can co-
ordinate on a “shame & blame” policy on dirty consumption and dirty investment, they
optimally go for an extreme. They either behave just like standard households, or they
choose to not consume and to not invest at all. Finally, we show that the responsible
behavior of households can induce change by forcing firms to choose more sustainable
production technologies.
In the paper, especially for the figures and their interpretation, we have assumed that
production and consumption come with a negative externality. However, the formalism
holds also for the opposite sign. Hence, if the product bears a positive externality, respon-
sible households should increase their consumption and investment by the same factor.
A green financial strategy should always be part of a responsible household’s behavior.
They should divest from dirty industries and overinvest in clean industries.
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